This paper studies the reasons and the costs of separating ownership from control by analyzing the decision of German dual class firms to consolidate their share structure from dual to single class equity between 1990 and 2001. We find that the firm value increases significantly by an average 4% on the announcement day. A significant part of the variation in abnormal returns can be explained by the ownership structure. A logit analysis of the unification decision yields that firms with less entrenched management are more likely to unify. Also, firms that are financially constrained are more likely to abolish dual class shares; these firms often issue additional shares after the stock unification.
Introduction
Dual class shares are common in many countries around the world. Among the 49 countries analyzed by La Porta et al. (1998) , 38 permit some form of separation between ownership and control and at least 21 of them actually do have dual class firms.
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This paper addresses the question whether dual class structures create or destroy value. The theoretical literature on this issue is indecisive as it just points out the costs and benefits of separating ownership from control but cannot determine the net effect. On the other hand, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the efficiency of dual class shares, and empirical results are mixed and often inconclusive.
2 This paper analyzes a unique sample of 89 German dual class firms from 1990 to 2001. Over this period, 32 firms decided to abolish their dual class structure. By analyzing the abnormal returns to the stock unification announcement, we can answer the question about the efficiency of dual class shares for the subset of firms that choose to abolish them. In addition, this approach allows us to distinguish between several potential sources of inefficiency, so that we can identify the main costs of dual class shares. We also analyze firms' decisions to abolish the dual class structure in order to understand why and when controlling shareholders agree to a dilution of their voting power.
We work with German data, because Germany is one of the largest capital markets where a large fraction of firms maintains a dual class structure. 3 Also, dual class structures are more homogenous in Germany than in many other countries, especially in the U.S. or the U.K., because German law severely restricts a firm's choice of dividend and voting rights of inferior voting shares. Moreover, German legislation on dual class shares did not change during our sample period. In particular, there was no legal change that forced firms to abolish dual class shares as in Israel (see Hauser and Lauterbach, 2004) or Switzerland (Kunz, 2002) . 1 In a study on cross-listed dual class firms, Doidge (2003) analyzes a sample of dual class firms from 20 countries which are included in the La Porta et al (1998) list. The 21 st country is the U.S.
In our event study, we find a 10% significant positive abnormal return for nonvoting shares and a 3% marginally significant positive abnormal return for voting shares. The total market capitalization increases significantly by 4% on average. Since the controlling shareholder must have agreed to the unification, the positive abnormal returns imply that dual class structures destroyed corporate value for those firms that choose to unify. Our results do not imply, however, that all dual class structures are inefficient. Existing event studies (Ang and Megginson, 1989 , for U.K. data and Kunz, 2002 , for Swiss data) do not find a significant effect of the announcement of a stock unification on a firm's market capitalization. Ang and Megginson (1989) work with monthly share prices, so that their tests have comparatively low power. The stock unifications analyzed by Kunz (2002) were largely anticipated due to a previous change in legislation that leveled the differences between the individual share classes.
In our dataset, we can also find indications that stock unifications were partly anticipated. Therefore, the 4% abnormal announcement return should be regarded a conservative estimate of the discount at which these dual class firms traded in the past.
In regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns we find strong evidence that the discount at which dual class firms trade before the unification announcement is mainly determined by agency costs. About 19% of the variation in the cumulative abnormal returns can be explained by the size of the largest voting block: Firms with larger blocks experience higher abnormal returns. Interestingly, the second largest block is not significantly related to the abnormal return, but the sum of all reported blocks is more significant than the largest block alone and can explain approximately 32% of the variation. This finding suggests that the smaller blockholders do not prevent the largest blockholder from extracting private benefits, but rather enter into a coalition with the largest blockholder to share in the private benefits. In addition, we find weak evidence for the hypotheses that dual class firms trade at a discount because liquidity is spread over two classes of shares or because dual class firms are less likely to be included in a stock market index. In contrast, we cannot find any evidence that international investors avoid dual class firms.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate when and why controlling shareholders agree to abolish the firm's dual class structure. We argue that the discount at which dual class companies trade in the market translates into a cost for the controlling shareholder if she wants to sell some of her shares or if the company plans to issue additional shares to outside shareholders. If these costs exceed the blockholder's expected private benefits from control, she will agree to a stock unification. Therefore, we expect that financially constrained firms (which need new equity capital) and firms with less entrenched managers 4 (who have fewer opportunities to extract private benefits) are more likely to perform a stock unification. In a logit analysis, we find that the size of the largest voting block has a significant negative impact on the unification probability, which corroborates that firms with more entrenched managers are less likely to perform a stock unification.
On the other hand, zero dividend payments significantly increase the probability of a stock unification, so financially constrained firms are more likely to abolish dual class shares.
Our empirical results are in stark contrast to the reasons for the stock unification
given by the firms themselves. The reasons most frequently given are to improve liquidity, to become more attractive to international investors and to improve the chances of the firm being included in a major stock index. Interestingly, these reasons are hardly significant in our empirical analysis. Instead, corporate governance issues turn out to be the main determinants of the decision to abolish dual class shares and the subsequent stock market reaction. Only three firms in our sample officially admitted that they abolished dual class shares in order to improve corporate governance.
We also establish that a stock unification is only one aspect of a more general transformation of a firm's ownership structure. In particular, we find that the average size of the largest voting block gradually decreases from 62% four years prior to the unification to 46% immediately before the unification and to 41% two years after the unification. Hence, the general picture that emerges from our analysis and previous research is that the introduction and the abolition of a dual class structure are two natural points of the life cycle of a firm. Young firms are typically financed by an individual or a family. As a firm grows, it needs more equity capital and the controlling shareholder might decide to issue non-voting shares in order to stay in control and continue consuming private benefits of control. As such a firm grows further and issues additional shares, the dual class structure becomes more and more costly to the controlling shareholder. Therefore, at some critical firm size, the blockholder decides to abandon the dual class structure and to give up her exclusive control. Consequently, a dual class structure should be considered a phase a firm is going through rather than a fixed characteristic of a firm.
5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the costs and benefits of dual class structures. On this basis, we develop a few hypotheses in Section 3 that will guide the subsequent empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces the dataset and some institutional details. Sections 5 and 6 contain the empirical analysis.
Section 5 studies the wealth effects of a stock unification and Section 6 investigates the unification decision. Finally, Section 7 concludes. The appendix explains how the variables used in the analysis have been constructed.
Review of the literature on the costs and benefits of dual class structures
Dual class firms typically have a blockholder who holds more than 50% of the voting rights but considerably less than 50% of the cash flow rights.
6
Such a controlling shareholder pays less than 50 cents for each dollar of private benefits she extracts from the firm. Consequently, more private benefits of control are extracted under a dual class structure than under a single class structure. If the controlling shareholder is risk neutral and wealthy enough to hold 50% of the cash flow rights, a single class structure is clearly more efficient than a dual class structure, because the 5 This argument could be analyzed with a duration model that models the time passed until the retirement of non-voting shares. Since our independent variables can only be sampled at annual intervals, a discrete proportional hazard model would be the most obvious choice. However, under the assumption that the baseline hazard does not depend on the duration (i.e. age) of the dual class structure, the discrete proportional hazard model is identical to the logit model used in our analysis (see Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998) . 6 In our sample, the largest shareholder controls a median 52.9% of the votes (see Table 2 ) and owns 36.8% of the cash flows (not reported in the tables). This is in line with DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) who report for the United States that corporate officers and their families hold a median 56.9%
of the votes and 24% of the cash flows. In contrast, Bergström and Rydqvist (1990) find that the largest shareholder coalition of Swedish dual class companies holds an average 40.3% of voting rights and 31.9% of cash flow rights. These results suggest that the proportion of votes needed for the extraction of private benefits differs between countries. In the following, we use the 50% threshold for illustrative purposes only. The argument continues to hold for any higher or lower threshold than 50%.
additional private benefits extracted under the dual class structure are more expensive to the firm than their value to the controlling shareholder is. However, if either the controlling shareholder is not wealthy enough to buy 50% of the cash flow rights or she is risk averse and therefore not willing to invest more money in the firm, a dual class structure can be efficient, because it allows the extraction of efficient private benefits that have a higher value to the controlling shareholder than they cost to the firm (see Bebchuck, 1999, and Gomes, 2000) . In addition, a dual class structure can improve the managements' incentives to exert effort (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), to invest in firm specific human capital (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985, Denis and Denis, 1994) , or to pursue the firm's growth opportunities (Attari and Banerjee, 2003 ).
An additional cost of dual class structures can arise when there are competing management teams that differ in their management quality and the amount of private benefits they can extract from the firm. Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) show that an inefficient team might end up managing the firm under a dual class structure, because they can extract more private benefits. In contrast, Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998) argue that dual class structures can be efficient because they potentially raise the probability of a welfare increasing takeover.
Given these contrary theoretical results, the question whether or not dual class structures are efficient remains an empirical issue. In order to answer this question, estimates of the costs of the dual class structure to the firm and estimates of the additional private benefits obtained by the controlling shareholder are needed, and accordingly the empirical literature falls into two branches. The first branch is concerned with the estimation of private benefits of control. Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2001) estimate private benefits of control from the price difference between block trades and market prices, whereas Nenova (2003) and Dittmann (2003) , among others, estimate private benefits of control from dual class share prices.
The second branch, to which this paper contributes, attempts to estimate the costs of the dual class structure to minority shareholders. Smart and Zutter (2003) find that dual class IPO firms have a markedly higher earnings-to-price multiplier than single class IPO firms. Partch (1987) finds a significantly positive price response of 1.2% to the announcement of plans to create a second class of shares in the US, but the median price response is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find a small significantly negative wealth effect of -0.8% for a wave of dual class recapitalizations in the mid 1980s. For the UK, Ang and Megginson (1989) report a positive abnormal return of 5.1% to the announcement of a plan to issue restricted voting shares. A potential explanation for these contradictory findings is that the introduction of a dual class structure also helps to overcome financing constraints faced by the firm. Such financing constraints can arise when the controlling shareholder is neither willing to invest more money in her firm nor to relinquish control by selling new equity to outsiders (see Attari and Banerjee, 2003) .
In such a situation, the announcement of a dual class reclassification means that a financially constrained single class firm becomes a financially unconstrained dual class firm, and it will be difficult to disentangle the two effects.
A more promising way to quantify the costs of the dual class structure is to study the abnormal returns to the announcement of a dual class stock unification, i. Merton, 1987) .
As international investors only invest in firms they have "heard of," we conjecture that the dual class discount is larger for bigger firms and for firms with a large proportion of foreign sales. An international investor is unlikely to invest in a small, local firm -independently of its share structure. Also, this discount is likely to be lower for firms that already have an international block investor.
Hypothesis A3 (liquidity): Dual class firms trade at a discount, because total liquidity is spread over two classes of shares. Under liquidity aspects, dual class structures can be regarded as an artificial segmentation of the market for the company's stock. When this segmentation is overcome by a stock unification, the merged market is likely to be more liquid in terms of volume or bid-ask spread.
Higher liquidity leads to higher market values, as shown by Amihud and Mendelsohn (1986) . We will test this hypothesis by considering the abnormal returns to the announcement of a stock unification separately for each class of shares. According to this hypothesis, the abnormal return should be higher for a class of shares with low liquidity that is unified with a class of shares with high liquidity.
Hypothesis A4 (index membership): A dual class firm has lower chances to be included in a major stock index. Therefore, dual class firms trade at a discount.
Two important criteria for a class of shares being included in one of the two major German indices 10 are its market capitalization and its average turnover. A stock unification improves both measures and therefore improves the probability of being included in a stock index. Shleifer (1986) , Dhillon and Johnson (1991) and Beneish and Whaley (1996) show that a firm that is added to the S&P 500 enjoys a permanent price increase of 3 to 4 percent. If a similar index effect is present in Germany, we expect a larger abnormal return to the announcement of a stock unification for those firms that are close to being included in or excluded from one of the two major indices.
There is a sizeable empirical literature which regresses the relative price difference between voting and non-voting shares on liquidity measures, the firm's ownership structure, and other proxies for agency costs (e.g. Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1995, and Nenova, 2003) . Zingales (1995) , Rydqvist (1996) , and Dittmann (2004) theoretically show that the price difference depends on the stability of the ruling coalition and on the private benefits that can be extracted by insiders, but it does not depend on the costs of the dual class structure. Consequently, this branch of the literature cannot provide any evidence for or against our hypotheses A1 to A4.
Hypotheses on the timing of dual class stock unifications
According to the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, dual class firms trade at a discount in the market, which implies that dual class firms could increase their market value by abolishing the dual class structure. As a consequence, dual class structures are not stable in firms with dispersed ownership, because all shareholders would be better off with a single class structure. In the presence of a price discount for dual class firms, dual class structures can only be stable when there is a controlling
shareholder. This implication is corroborated by the empirical evidence (see, among others, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985 , Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990 , Megginson, 1990 , and Table 2 in this paper): Dual class firms almost always have a controlling blockholder.
We argue that the discount at which dual class companies trade is the key reason for the controlling shareholder to agree to a stock unification. If the controlling shareholder sells some of her shares or if the firm issues new stock, the price discount translates into a cost to the controlling shareholder which she can only avoid by abolishing the dual class structure before such a transaction. On the other hand, as long as no additional shares are sold to outsiders, there is no reason to give up the separation between ownership and control. This argument leads to four hypotheses about the timing of dual class stock unifications.
Hypothesis B1 (entrenchment): Dual class firms with more entrenched management are less likely to abolish the dual class structure. Recall that we call managers 'entrenched' if (1) they have incentives to extract inefficient private benefits and (2) they are not prevented from such inefficient rent extraction. Entrenched managers have more opportunities to extract private benefits of control so the value of the dual class structure to managers (weakly) increases in the degree of entrenchment.
Hypothesis B2 (growth opportunities): Dual class firms with strong growth
opportunities are more likely to abolish the dual class structure. In order to pursue its growth opportunities, the firm will have to issue additional equity. In this situation, the controlling shareholder incurs a significant cost from the dual class structure, as the company's shares trade at a discount in the market. There are three possible actions for the controlling shareholder: When private benefits of control are low, she will abolish the dual class structure first and then issue additional equity. On the other hand, if private benefits are high, the controlling shareholder will not agree to a stock unification. Then she will either decide to issue new equity at a discount or she will not issue any equity and pass up the growth opportunity. She will pass up the growth opportunity if the expected growth is small, because then the costs from issuing new shares at a discount are higher than the benefit from growth. Hence, dual class firms can be expected to grow at a slower rate than comparable single class firms.
Hypothesis B3 (financing constraints): Financially constrained dual class
firms are more likely to abolish the dual class structure. We call a firm financially constrained if it has difficulties financing its current operations from retained earnings or additional debt. Financial constraints can be overcome by issuing additional equity, but under a dual class structure this incurs additional costs to the firm and its controlling shareholder. Therefore, we hypothesize that financially constrained firms are more likely to abolish the dual class structure and to issue new equity subsequently. One reason for financial constraints are positive growth opportunities, so hypotheses B2 and B3 are closely related. However, firms can also be financially constrained without having strong growth opportunities, for instance when they are restructuring their operations.
Hypothesis B4 (cashing out): Dual class firms whose controlling shareholders want to sell a significant amount of their shares are more likely to abolish the dual class structure. When controlling shareholders want to sell shares, they will consider abolishing the dual class structure first and then offering their shares in order to avoid selling at a discount. This argument only holds if the shares will be sold to small shareholders or to an institutional investor. When a block of shares is sold to another non-institutional blockholder, the discount of the share price in the market is irrelevant. Institutional investors, on the other hand, typically have little incentives to extract private benefits of control and are interested in a high market valuation of their investments.
In independent work, Pajuste (2004) presents a logit analysis of the decision to abolish dual class stock for a sample of dual class firms from seven European countries including Germany.
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Her evidence mainly corroborates our entrenchment hypothesis B1. In particular, she finds that firms are more likely to abolish the dual class structure if the separation between ownership and control is low, if the largest shareholder is a financial institution, or if the firm is cross listed in the US. Also, the number of acquisitions has a positive impact on the unification probability. This finding supports our growth opportunities hypothesis B2. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) list the reasons given by 54 Canadian firms why they consolidated their share structure from dual to single class equity. These self-reported reasons are in line with 11 Pajuste's (2004) works with a sample of dual class firms from seven European countries (including Germany) that is constructed from different data sources than our sample. She considers the period from 1996 to 2002, while we analyze the years 1990 to 2001. She also includes firms with only one type of stock listed whereas we restrict our analysis to firms with both types of shares listed.
Finally, her ownership data are from 1996 while we work with annual ownership data. Pajuste (2004) does not consider announcement effects, which is the main contribution of our paper. Also, our results on the relevance of the ownership structure for the unification decision nicely complement Pajuste's (2004) 
Dataset and institutional details
German law distinguishes between voting and non-voting shares. Shares with multiple or fractional votes are not permitted and the number of non-voting shares must not exceed the number of voting shares. Non-voting shares must be vested with a cumulative minimum dividend, the size of which (typically between 2% and 10% of the face value) is laid down in the company's charter. Accordingly, the total dividend For the identified 139 firms, we compiled ownership information 13 , the 12 The first five digits of the six-digit German security identification number identify the firm and the last digit the type of security. A last digit between 0 and 2 is reserved for classes of common voting shares, whereas digits of 3 and higher typically identify non-voting shares and other securities (like participation certificates or options). We searched for pairs of stock with the same first five digits and at least one last digit of 3 or higher. Then we analyzed the names of these securities in order to eliminate all pairs that obviously were not shares of a dual class firm.
13 Before 1995, German disclosure laws required that share holdings of 25% or more must be published. From 1995 onwards, all voting blocks of at least 5% are to be reported. Consequently, our ownership data are comparatively imprecise before 1995. Note, however, that for only 5% of our observations before 1995 the size of the largest blockholding is not reported (and therefore set equal to number of outstanding shares and charter provisions regarding voting power and dividend differences from Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, the German equivalent of Moody's Manual. We excluded firms for which (1) we could not obtain stock market data for both shares on at least 60 days (22 firms), (2) analysis. For this period, we could identify the reasons of all discontinuations. We dropped another 11 firms from our sample, because we do not have market data on both types of shares for any year after 1990. Our final dataset contains 89 dual class companies and 814 firm-year observations. For 42 of these companies, one or both zero). Our results do not change when we drop these observations from our dataset. Nevertheless, information on smaller blocks must be considered unreliable before 1995. We address this problem by using year dummies and by repeating our analysis for the subsample from 1995 to 2001. In our event study sample, we verify our ownership data using newspaper articles, so that the data reflect the situation immediately before the unification announcement. In this sample, we always have information on the largest voting block.
14 In German, non-voting shares are -rather euphemistically -called preference shares as they are entitled to a minimum (or preferred) dividend. The preference shares of eight firms were voting shares.
types of shares ceased to trade during our observation period. We classify 32 of these discontinuations as stock unifications: One company bought back its non-voting shares, and 31 companies converted each non-voting share into one voting share. In one of these 31 conversions, non-voting shareholders had to make an additional payment, and in eight cases there were outstanding past minimum dividends that were not paid before the conversion. The remaining 10 discontinuations were due to bankruptcy (1), mergers (8), or tender offers (1).
Figure 1 displays the frequency of stock unifications for each year in our sample.
In 1990, 1991 and 1994, there were no stock unifications and, before 1996, the frequency never exceeded 3%. In contrast, the frequency of stock unifications was always above 6% after 1997 with a peak of over 10% in 2000. There are a number of reasons for the growing popularity of stock unifications in the mid 1990s. First, during the 1990s, the German stock market became more internationally oriented. Firms were concerned about the attractiveness of their capital structure to international investors and dual class shares were generally seen as an impediment for international investments. In addition, in August 2000, Deutsche Börse announced a change of the rules that determine which companies are included in the major German stock indices.
After the change had taken effect in June 2002, companies were ranked according to the free float of their most liquid class of stock -and not anymore according to their total market capitalization. Hence, some companies unified their dual class shares in order to stay in an index or to increase the probability to be included in an index. firms whose SIC code starts with '6') whenever we use these accounting variables, because accounting data are generally not comparable between financial and nonfinancial firms. As proxies for growth opportunities, we use Tobin's q, investment scaled by total assets and sales growth. Proxies for financial constraints are dividends, cash flows, cash, and increase in total debt (all scaled by total assets), as well as leverage and the payout ratio.
Market reaction to the announcement of a stock unification
This section presents the results of an event study for 29 German firms that announced a stock unification between 1989 and 2002 and actually performed a stock unification thereafter. To our knowledge there was never an announcement of a stock unification that was not completed. In order to increase the number of firms in the event study, we consider a slightly larger time period than in the logit dataset and include five firms in addition to the 32 stock unifications described in the previous section.
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We then exclude eight of these 37 firms for the following reasons. For two firms, we could not find the date of the first announcement in the business press; three firms simultaneously announced other important events like a merger, a major 16 We include one firm (Massa) that announced a stock unification in 1989 and three firms (Escada, According to German law, non-voting shares can be converted one-to-one into voting shares if -in addition to the general annual meeting -75% of non-voting shareholders agree in a separate meeting. Then the dual class structure is immediately abandoned. Alternatives are to repurchase non-voting shares in the market, or to offer non-voting shareholders to exchange each non-voting share plus a fixed cash payment for one voting share. In both cases, non-voting shareholders cannot be forced to participate in the conversion, so that the dual class structure -at least formallycontinues to exist.
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Presumably, this is the reason why one-to-one conversions are much more popular in Germany than in Israel (see Hauser and Lauterbach, 2004) . Table 3 provides a list of the 29 companies in our event study. It shows the company name, the date of the first announcement, the terms of conversion, and additional announcements made on the same day. The typical terms of conversion are that each non-voting share is converted into one voting share without any additional payment or any compensation to old voting shareholders. Column 3 of Table 3 shows the deviations from this general rule. In five cases, outstanding minimum dividends were not paid. In two cases, non-voting shareholders had to make an additional payment equal to two thirds of the previous price difference between voting and nonvoting shares. One company announced to buy back non-voting shares for 80% of the price of voting shares. As some companies announced other events like a stock split,
an SEO, or an extra dividend, we separately analyze a group of 13 firms that exclusively announced a stock unification and that did not require an additional 17 These firms initially had non-voting shares, unregistered voting shares, and registered voting shares. They announced the conversion of non-voting shares into unregistered voting shares.
18 All remaining firms have less than 8% missing values in either window.
19 MAN, for example, announced an exchange offer for non-voting shareholders in March 2002.
During a period of six weeks, each non-voting share could be exchanged for one voting share for an additional payment of €3.30, which corresponds to two thirds of the average price difference between voting and non-voting shares during the previous three months. 86 .2% of all non-voting shares were exchanged at these terms, so that the proportion of voting shares increased from 72% to 96%. In June 2004, non-voting shares were still listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange.
payment from non-voting shareholders. The names of these companies are printed in bold letters in Table 3 .
We use a 41 day event window and a 200 day estimation window from trading day -220 to -21 relative to the announcement date. We estimate a market model using the full Frankfurt market portfolio (DAFOX) provided by KKMDB. Figure 2 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for voting shares, non-voting shares and the total market capitalization of the 29 firms in our sample. Figure 3 displays the corresponding plot for the 13 firms with "clean" announcements. Both plots suggest that there was a run-up for voting and non-voting shares to a CAR between 6% and 10% on day -1. On the announcement day, non-voting shares experience an additional abnormal return of 3% in the full sample and 2.5% in the 'clean' subsample, while there is no distinct reaction for voting shares. In the full sample, the CAR declines gradually over the remaining event window for both shares. In the 'clean' sub-sample, however, the CAR fluctuates around its day 1 value over the remaining days of the event window. Cowan and Sergeant (1996) show in a simulation study that the Standard Test rejects the null hypothesis too often in two situations: (1) if the announcement has an impact not only on the mean but also on the variance of the abnormal returns, and (2) if the shares under consideration are thinly traded. As some of the companies in our sample are very small, we are particularly worried about the thin trading bias and therefore also report the results of two non-parametric tests: the
Corrado (1989) Rank Test and the Generalized Sign Test proposed by Corrado and
Zivney (1992). In Cowan and Sergeant's (1996) simulation study, these two tests turned out to be robust to thin trading and to changes in the return variance.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the reaction of non-voting shares is significantly positive according to all three tests. The abnormal returns of voting shares (shown in Panel B) are also positive but smaller than the abnormal returns of non-voting 20 Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) describe this test ('J 2 ') on p. 162. Cowan and Sergeant (1996) call it 'Patell test'.
shares.
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In both samples, the generalized sign test cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for voting shares. In contrast, the Corrado rank test finds a significant abnormal reaction in the full sample but not in the 'clean' sub-sample. The standard test rejects the null hypothesis in both samples. We conclude that there is some evidence that voting shares experience a positive abnormal announcement return. Finally, Panel C displays that the reaction of the full market capitalization (i.e.
the weighted sum of the reactions of voting and non-voting shares) is again significantly positive in both samples according to all three tests. Across the three windows and the two samples, estimates for the average increase of the firms' market value vary between 3.3% and 6.3%.
Altogether, Table 4 corroborates our general hypothesis that dual class firms trade at a discount in the stock market. In order to learn about the reasons why this is the case, we present univariate regressions of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in 21 The difference in the abnormal returns of voting and non-voting shares is statistically significant at the 5% level in the full sample. In the 'clean' sub-sample, the difference is insignificant. These results are not shown in the tables.
point. Therefore, the agency costs hypothesis A1 is clearly corroborated by the data.
We also find weak evidence that the presence of an institutional investor results in a lower abnormal return as predicted by this hypothesis. In contrast the proportion of voting shares (PropVS) is insignificant.
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Our results from Table 5 do not support the international investors hypothesis A2.
Neither the presence of an international investor, nor the size of the firm have a significant effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. The percentage of foreign sales has a highly significant negative effect on the CAR over the [-4 The liquidity hypothesis A3 implies that the abnormal return of a particular class of shares should be higher if this class of shares has low liquidity and if it is unified with a more liquid class of shares. In order to check this implication, we regress the voting CARs on the trading volume of voting shares and on the trading volume of non-voting shares.
24
The results are reported in the upper part of Table 6 . The signs of the estimated coefficients are indeed as expected but none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. The lower part of Table 6 shows the results of two similar regressions of the non-voting CARs. For the [-4 ; 1] window, we find that the cumulative abnormal return is significantly higher for less liquid non-voting shares.
However, the same coefficient is insignificant for the [-10 ; 10] window. 22 We also considered additional dummy variables that indicate whether the largest blockholder is an institution, an individual (or a family), or the state. These variables remain insignificant in all regressions, so we do not report these results. 23 One could also argue that the positive abnormal returns might be due to changes in future growth expectations. It is difficult, however, to find proxies for changes in growth expectations. The only evidence we can provide on this issue is that the incidence of a future SEO (as measured by our variable SEO) is not significantly correlated with abnormal returns. In addition, this growth expectation hypothesis cannot explain the influence of the ownership structure on abnormal returns. 24 Our data source does not contain bid or ask prices, so we cannot use bid-ask spreads.
Empirical analysis of the timing of stock unifications
In this section, we turn to the question why and when the controlling shareholder agrees to a stock unification. We first consider only those firms that did announce a stock unification during our sample period. Table 7 displays the average value of 17 firm characteristics for each of the five years from two years before to two years after the announcement. The average size of the largest block of voting shares decreases monotonically and significantly from 54% two years before the announcement to 41% two years after the announcement. Figure 4 demonstrates that the gradual decline of BSize1 already starts four years before the announcement of a stock unification.
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However, the average proportion of cash flow rights held by the largest blockholder increases from year 0 to year 1 as some controlling shareholders buy additional shares around the unification time in order to secure control. This refutes the cashing out hypothesis B4; controlling shareholders do not disinvest after the stock unification. shareholder. There is a slight increase from 3.7% to 5.4% during the year before the announcement of a stock unification, but this increase in not significant. Hence, we do not find any evidence for Bigelli's (2004) hypothesis that the controlling shareholder buys non-voting shares prior to the announcement in order to benefit from the dual class unification.
firms choose to unify before they issue new shares.
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Our proxies for growth opportunities (TobinsQ, Investment, and SalesGrowth) suggest that unifying firms grow faster before the unification (-2 to 0) than after the unification (+1 and +2), even though the individual changes are not significant. Finally, the payout ratio (PayoutR) rises significantly from 13% two years before to 24% two years after the unification.
However, the other proxies for financing constraints do not indicate that a stock unification helps to relax financing constraints.
The next step in our analysis is to compare firms that abolished their dual class structure during our sample period with those firms that did not give up dual class shares. At the 10% significance level, the seasoned equity offering dummy SEO is significantly higher for firms that abolish dual class shares than for those that do not.
We interpret this finding as evidence for the growth opportunities hypothesis B2, because an SEO clearly signals future growth. This interpretation is consistent with the results for the other three proxies for growth opportunities (TobinsQ, Investment and SalesGrowth), although none of these differences are statistically significant.
We now turn from comparing firms with and without stock unification to comparing firm-years with and without stock unification, i.e. we also consider the within-firm variation in addition to the between-firm variation. Table 9 shows that the size of the largest voting block BSize1 is significantly smaller in unification years than 27 There are eight firm-years in our dataset, in which the firm announced a stock unification and issued new equity. In all cases, the equity was issued after the unification announcement. 28 We also considered dummy variables that signal 'no dividends on non-voting shares in the current year' or 'no dividends on voting shares'. The empirical results are very similar for these variables. The reason is that these dummies are highly correlated, because voting shares cannot receive dividends when non-voting shares do not receive any.
in other years. Also, the proportion of voting shares PropVS is significantly higher for firm-years in which a unification is announced. This implies that, on average, dual class firms repurchase non-voting shares before they announce a stock unification.
Both results corroborate the entrenchment hypothesis B1.
We now consider a logit analysis that allows us to obtain multivariate results. In order to appropriately accommodate the time dimension of our dataset, we apply a logit model with year dummies:
, where Y it is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i decides to unify its dual class structure in year t. X it is a vector of independent variables and β is the parameter vector we want to estimate.
29 Figure 1 shows that the unconditional probability of a stock unification varies considerably between 1990 and 2001. The year dummies α t in model (1) remove this variation over time, so that β only captures the effect of the independent variables across firms.
Although Figure 1 already suggests that the unconditional unification probability is not constant, we formally test this hypothesis with a likelihood ratio test. We perform this test without additional independent variables and find that the hypothesis that the unification probability is constant over time is rejected at the 0.5% significance level for the full sample. If we restrict the sample to the years 1996 to 2001, we cannot reject the hypothesis at any significance level below 50%.
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Therefore, we will report two sets of results: one for the full sample using the model with year dummies (1) and another one for the 1996-2001 sample without year dummies, where α t = α. The results can be found in Table 10 . 29 The structure of the data does not allow the consistent estimation of firm fixed effects. Since firms leave our sample after performing a stock unification, the number of observations per firm is limited even if the time dimension becomes arbitrarily large. Also, an elimination of the firm fixed effects using a conditional logit approach is not feasible, because the firms in our sample either never perform a stock unification or they perform exactly one stock unification and leave the sample thereafter. Hence, the sum of all stock unifications performed by a firm completely determines the dependent observations for this firm. As a consequence, the conditional likelihood is constant and cannot be used for the estimation of additional parameters. 30 These results are not reported in the tables.
The table shows that the proportion of voting shares PropVS is highly significant in the univariate logit regression (model 2) but becomes insignificant in the multivariate regressions (model 4). On the other hand, BSize1 and NoDiv2 remain significant and can explain a considerable fraction of the variation in the sample. We do not include SEO in the logit regression, because firms are likely to decide simultaneously on a stock unification and an SEO, so that the SEO dummy is not exogenous in regressions of the unification decision. In linear instrumental variables regressions where we use all remaining variables listed in Table 2 as instruments (results not shown in the tables), SEO has no significant influence on the unification decision.
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We conclude from Table 10 that firms with less entrenched management and financially constrained firms are more likely to abolish dual class shares. 31 We also analyzed the two decisions jointly in an unordered logit model. The only additional insight of this exercise is that firms are more likely to perform an SEO when leverage is high. We therefore do not report these results in the tables.
Conclusions and further notes
In this paper, we empirically study the costs of separating ownership and control and the reasons for giving up this separation. We use a panel dataset of 89 German dual class firms over a time period of 12 years and show in an event study that abolishing the dual class structure results in a 4% abnormal increase in total market capitalization. The average abnormal announcement return for non-voting shares (approx. 10%) is markedly higher than for voting shares (approx. 3%). In regressions of the cumulative abnormal returns, we find strong support for the agency cost hypothesis A1 that firms with more entrenched management trade at a higher discount in the stock market, as the announcement return is significantly positively related to the size of the largest block of voting shares and negatively related to the proportion of shares in the free float. We also find weak evidence in favor of the liquidity hypothesis A3 and of the index membership hypothesis A4. Compared to agency costs, however, liquidity and index membership appear to be second order effects. We do not find any evidence for hypothesis A2 that international investors avoid dual class firms.
The second part of the paper analyzes the decision to abolish dual class shares. We find substantial evidence for our argument that firms with more entrenched management are less likely and that firms in need of additional equity capital are more likely to consolidate their share structure from dual to single class equity. We find no evidence, however, that the controlling shareholder opts for a stock unification because she wants to divest her investment. On the contrary, the average controlling shareholder invests additional money in the firm at the time of the stock unification in order to secure control.
The fact that our logit analysis can identify a number of determinants of stock unifications suggests that the market should -at least to some extent -anticipate stock unification announcements. In our sample of 29 firms that announce a stock unification we find indeed clear evidence for such an anticipation: The spread at which non-voting shares trade relative to voting shares declines on average by 44% from two years before the unification announcement to four weeks before the announcement. Therefore, the 4% abnormal increase in firm value should be regarded a conservative estimate of the net costs of the dual class structure for these firms.
Our event study yields that non-voting shares enjoy a significantly higher abnormal return to the unification announcement than voting shares. This result raises the question why voting shareholders give away so much value to non-voting shareholders. Why doesn't the firm buy back the non-voting shares instead of converting them into voting shares? This question implicitly assumes that non-voting shares can be bought by the company at a price equal to or slightly above their preannouncement price. Whether this assumption is reasonable critically depends on what happens to the remaining non-voting shareholders who are not willing to sell their shares. There are three possible scenarios. First, if the remaining non-voting shareholders can be forced to sell, a buy-back might indeed be cheaper than a stock unification. In Germany this is not feasible, except if the corporate charter explicitly allows it.
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Even if this is the case, German courts might prevent a forced buy-back because of a violation of the principle of proportionality. Alternatively, the remaining non-voting shares continue to exist. In this case, a buy-back is cheaper than a stock unification, but the original aim to simplify the capital structure and to abandon nonvoting shares is not achieved.
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Finally, the company can convert the remaining nonvoting shares into voting shares. If non-voting shareholders correctly anticipate this, they will not be willing to sell their shares for the pre-announcement price. In fact, there is little difference between a buy-back with subsequent stock unification and a straight stock unification right away. Hence, a buy-back is not a cheaper alternative to a stock unification as it may seem to be at first glance.
32 Such a rule must be laid down in the corporate charter before the first offering of non-voting shares. Typically, corporate charters of German dual class firms do not include such a rule. 
Appendix: Description of variables
All variables are compiled for the year Y under consideration if not stated differently.
For years in which a firm announced a stock unification, we made sure that the ownership variables reflect the situation before the announcement date.
Conversion is a dummy variable that is set equal to one for those years in which the firm announced a dual class unification. In all cases, the unification was completed in the same calendar year.
BSize1 is the largest block of voting shares expressed as a percentage of all outstanding voting shares. Separate stakes that were obviously or reportedly held by members of one family were counted as one block.
BSize2 is the second-largest block of voting shares.
Freefloat is equal to one minus the sum of all blocks of voting shares reported in
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften.
NoInstInv is a dummy variable that is set equal to one for those years in which none of the voting blockholders was an institutional investor. We counted neither the state nor specialized holdings that were founded only to invest in the considered company as an institutional investor.
NoInterInv is a dummy variable that is set equal to one for those years in which all voting blockholders were German individuals or German firms.
PropVS is the number of voting shares divided by the number of voting and nonvoting shares.
MCap is the market capitalization in million euro at the end of June of year Y-1.
logMCap is the natural logarithm of MCap.
IndexDistance is the natural logarithm of the distance to the smallest constituent of the next index in terms of market capitalization. More precisely, it is defined as SEO is a dummy variable that is set equal to one for those years in which the firm issued new shares in a seasoned equity offering.
TobinsQ is total assets (02999) plus market capitalization (MCap) minus book equity The table displays the names of the 29 companies in our event study, the date of the first announcement of the stock unification decision, and additional announcements made at the same time. The column 'special terms of conversion' only reports departures from the general rule that each non-voting share is converted into one voting share without additional payment. Firms with names in bold letters belong to the sub-sample with 'clean announcement' and without additional payments. 
Company name

Frequency of stock unifications by year
For each year, the plot displays the proportion of dual class firms that performed a stock unification.
Figure 2:
Cumulative average abnormal returns for all 29 companies 
Average block of voting and non-voting shares held by largest blockholder
The plot displays the average proportion of voting shares in the largest voting block (i.e. BSize1), the proportion of non-voting shares and the proportion of cash flow rights held by the same individual for the eight years from 5 years before the announcement to 2 years after the announcement of a stock unification. The plot is based on 22 firms for which we have non-missing values for all eight years. 
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